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1  | INTRODUC TION
Cognition plays an important role in the development and mainte‐
nance of insomnia. Researchers have focused on the cognitive‐hy‐
perarousal mechanism, in which people with insomnia symptoms 
tend to experience excessive and uncontrollable worry about their 
poor sleep quality (also referred to as cognitive arousal in the litera‐
ture; Nicassio, Mendlowitz, Fussell, & Petras, 1985). Worry, then, typ‐
ically triggers excessive levels of effort and intention to sleep (Espie, 
Broomfield, Macmahon, Macphee, & Taylor, 2006) and activates the 
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Abstract
Cognitive models of insomnia highlight the role of biased cognition in sleep‐related 
information, which is proposed to underlie pre‐sleep worry, which in turn results in 
both subjective and objective sleep deficits. To test this hypothesis, the current study 
investigated interpretational bias, which is a tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli 
in a threat‐related (here: insomnia‐related) manner. We specifically hypothesized that 
interpretational bias would be associated with (a) pre‐sleep worry and (b) poor sub‐
jective	 and	objective	 sleep.	 Interpretational	 bias	was	measured	using	 the	 ambigu‐
ous scenario task, in which participants (n = 76, community sample) were presented 
with two types of scenarios (insomnia and anxiety related) that could be alternatively 
interpreted in a neutral manner. Participants additionally completed questionnaires 
to assess global sleep quality and pre‐sleep worry, which were followed by 1‐week 
sleep assessments (via diaries and actigraphy) to estimate specific, daily subjective 
and objective sleep parameters. The results showed that insomnia‐related (but not 
anxiety‐related) interpretational bias was positively associated with pre‐sleep worry 
as	well	as	overall	sleep	quality.	However,	these	associations	could	be	explained	by	
general trait anxiety. We also found no connection to specific subjective or objec‐
tive parameters of daily sleep, such as sleep onset latency. These findings support 
the cognitive‐hyperarousal mechanism, where biased cognition (together with trait 
anxiety) underlies pre‐sleep worry. The association with overall sleep quality, but 
not with specific, daily subjective or objective sleep parameters, may suggest that 
interpretational bias is specifically relevant for how individuals judge and describe 
their sleep quality.
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central	 nervous	 system	 by	 enhancing	 emotional	 distress	 (Harvey,	
2002;	Harvey,	Tang,	&	Browning,	2005).	This	 cognitive,	emotional	
and/or physiological hyperarousal impedes the normal initiation of 
sleep.	 Indeed,	empirical	research	has	shown	that	worry	and	symp‐
tom‐focused rumination are associated with sleep disturbances (e.g., 
Carney,	Harris,	Moss,	&	Edinger,	2010;	Ellis,	Mitchell,	&	Hogh,	2007).	
Furthermore, pre‐sleep worry about sleeplessness and the possible 
consequences of poor sleep are known to be a good predictor of, 
for example, increased sleep onset latency (Wicklow & Espie, 2000; 
Wuyts et al., 2012).
As	 a	 possible	 mechanism	 underlying	 sleep	 disturbances,	 cog‐
nitive models of insomnia have suggested biased cognition toward 
sleep‐related	 information	 (Espie	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Harvey,	 2002).	 For	
example, some studies have suggested that the attention of poor 
sleepers is more likely to be captured by internal and external cues 
of	sleep	than	is	the	attention	of	good	sleepers	(Harris	et	al.,	2015).	
This form of selective attention is thought to cause, for example, 
excessive clock monitoring (i.e., watching a clock to know how many 
minutes they have spent sleeping; Woods, Marchetti, Biello, & Espie, 
2009), and to further trigger worry about sleeplessness and daytime 
dysfunctions (e.g., Macmahon, Broomfield, & Espie, 2006; however, 
see	 Spiegelhalder	 et	 al.,	 2018	 for	 null	 findings	 on	 attention	 bias).	
Another	form	of	biased	cognition	is	interpretational	bias,	which	can	
be observed when people make an inference and deduce a conclu‐
sion	 on	 an	 ambiguous	 and	 open‐ended	 situation.	 Interpretational	
bias has been extensively studied in regard to depression and anxi‐
ety; studies typically found that individuals with these disorders in‐
terpret ambiguous situations negatively (e.g., scrambled sentences 
and	ambiguous	scenarios;	Hirsch,	Meeten,	Krahé,	&	Reeder,	2016).	
In	the	context	of	insomnia,	Ree,	Pollitt,	and	Harvey	(2006)	investi‐
gated how normal and poor sleepers interpret ambiguous scenarios, 
either in a threat‐related (i.e., insomnia or anxiety related) or neu‐
tral manner. They have found that poor sleepers tend to interpret 
ambiguous scenarios in a more insomnia‐ and anxiety‐related man‐
ner	 than	do	normal	 sleepers	 (cf.	 Ellis,	Gardini,	&	Hogh,	 2010;	Ree	
&	Harvey,	2006).	In	accordance	with	these	findings,	another	exper‐
imental study found that individuals with insomnia misperceived 
their own morphed faces as appearing more tired than they actu‐
ally were, which is also a form of biased interpretation and confirms 
the	symptoms	of	their	disorder	(Akram,	Ellis,	Myachykov,	&	Barclay,	
2016). These findings support the prediction of the cognitive models 
that biased cognition would cause individuals to detect threatening 
(or sleep‐related) cues and subsequently associate those cues with 
sleep difficulties (e.g., interpret a pale face as an indication of sleep‐
lessness). This becomes a source of sleep‐related worry and rumina‐
tion	that	perpetuates	sleep	disturbances	 (Harvey	et	al.,	2005;	Ree	
et	al.,	2006).	However,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	this	direct	link	
between biased sleep‐related cognition and worry has not yet been 
examined. Therefore, the current study aimed to establish this asso‐
ciation, particularly in regard to insomnia‐consistent interpretational 
bias.
Individuals	 with	 subjective	 sleep	 disturbances	 often	 overesti‐
mate	sleep‐onset	latency	(SOL)	and	underestimate	total	sleep	time	
(TST)	relative	to	objective	measures	of	polysomnography	or	actig‐
raphy	 (for	a	review,	see	Harvey	&	Tang,	2012).	This	misperception	
of	sleep	is	a	hallmark	of	insomnia‐related	cognition.	Individuals	are	
convinced that they have substantially less sleep and worse daytime 
performances than they do in reality, thereby triggering dysfunc‐
tional safety behaviours to compensate for their perceived lack of 
sleep	 (e.g.,	Harvey,	 2002).	 Importantly,	 sleep	misperception	 is	 ob‐
served not only in people who have real (physiological) sleep deficits, 
but also in individuals whose objective sleep parameters are within 
the normal range (e.g., McCall & Edinger, 1992). The phenomenolog‐
ical similarity between interpretational bias and sleep misperception 
leads to the hypothesis that people with interpretational bias may 
“interpret” their subjective sleep quality as poor, even when there 
is	 no	objective	 impairment.	 In	 addition,	 it	 is	 known	 that	pre‐sleep	
worry	is	associated	with	an	overestimation	of	SOL	and	underestima‐
tion	of	TST	relative	to	objective	measures	of	sleep	(Takano,	Boddez,	
&	Raes,	2016;	Tang	&	Harvey,	2004).	Hence,	the	second	goal	of	the	
present study was to explicitly test whether interpretational bias is 
related to objectively or subjectively measured sleep disturbances.
In	summary,	the	current	study	investigated	cognitive	processes	
that have been identified by cognitive models of insomnia. We first 
tested the positive association between interpretational bias and 
pre‐sleep	worry.	 Interpretational	bias	was	measured	using	the	am‐
biguous	scenario	task	(AST;	Ree	et	al.,	2006),	in	which	participants	
are presented with ambiguous scenarios related to either insomnia 
or anxiety that could be alternatively interpreted in a neutral man‐
ner. We assessed anxiety‐consistent as well as insomnia‐consistent 
interpretational bias to determine whether pre‐sleep worry is specif‐
ically associated with a bias for insomnia‐related information or with 
interpretational	bias	 in	general.	 Second,	we	 tested	 the	association	
between interpretational bias and subjective and objective mea‐
sures	of	sleep.	Upon	completion	of	the	AST,	participants	undertook	
sleep assessments at home using actigraphy and by keeping a sleep 
diary. We predicted that insomnia‐consistent interpretational bias 
would be associated with subjective estimates of sleep parameters 
(i.e.,	 longer	SOL	and	shorter	TST)	and	poorer	overall	evaluation	of	
sleep, whereas this bias would have smaller or even null associations 
with objective estimates of sleep on actigraphy.
2  | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
Eighty‐five participants were recruited via social network services 
and	 flyers	 distributed	 at	 LMU	Munich.	 Participants	were	 included	
in the present study if they were (a) 18 – 30 years old, (b) fluent in 
German and (c) did not have a physiological disorder that prevented 
them from performing the experimental tasks or sleep assess‐
ments. Based on these criteria, five participants had to be excluded. 
Furthermore, two participants only wore an actigraph for one or 
two nights, data from one participant were lost due to incorrect op‐
eration of the software and one participant did not complete the 
baseline assessment. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 76 
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participants	(66	women)	with	a	mean	age	of	22.64	(SD = 3.01) years. 
The rational for targeting a non‐clinical population is that biased 
cognition is thought to be a transitional state in the development 
of insomnia that is characterized by a serious objective sleep defi‐
cit (Espie et al., 2006). Therefore, we assumed that insomnia‐related 
bias is most likely observed in subclinical individuals who have not 
yet developed chronic symptoms but have some complaints about 
sleep.
The sample size was determined based on the effect sizes ob‐
served in Ree et al. (2006). The effect sizes (for the differences 
in interpretational bias between poor and good sleepers) were 
d = 0.70 and 0.78 for forced‐choice and open‐ended responses 
of	 the	AST,	 respectively.	Our	power	 analysis	 (with	G*power;	 Faul,	
Erdfelder,	Lang,	&	Buchner,	2007)	estimated	a	required	sample	size	
of n	=	54–68	to	detect	the	sizes	of	the	effects	based	on	the	assump‐
tions of alpha = 0.05 and power = 0.80.
2.2 | Measures
2.2.1 | Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI)
The	 PSQI	 (Buysse,	 Reynolds,	 Monk,	 Berman,	 &	 Kupfer,	 1989;	
Riemann & Backhaus, 1996) was used to assess participants’ sub‐
jective	sleep	difficulties	over	 the	past	4	weeks.	The	PSQI	consists	
of 18 items (excluding co‐sleeping items), which are combined into 
seven subscales: sleep duration, sleep disturbances, sleep latency, 
daytime dysfunction, sleep efficiency, sleep quality and sleep medi‐
cation.	The	subscales	are	scored	on	a	4‐point	scale.	A	global	score	
with a possible range of 0 to 21 is obtained by adding the subscores; 
higher	scores	indicate	worse	overall	sleep	quality.	The	PSQI	global	
score exhibited moderate internal consistency in the current sample 
(Cronbach's α = 0.51).
2.2.2 | Pre‐sleep arousal scale (PSAS)
The	PSAS	(Gieselmann,	de	Jong‐Meyer,	&	Pietrowsky,	2012;	Nicassio	
et al., 1985) was used to assess pre‐sleep arousal in general (not spe‐
cific to the previous night). This scale consists of two subscales: cog‐
nitive arousal as an index for pre‐sleep worry (e.g., “Worry about 
falling	asleep”)	and	somatic	arousal	(e.g.,	“Heart	racing,	pounding	or	
beating irregularly”). Each subscale consists of eight items, which are 
rated on a 5‐point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely); higher values 
indicate higher cognitive and somatic arousal. Both subscales exhib‐
ited good internal consistency in the current data (α = 0.69 and 0.91, 
respectively).
2.2.3 | State‐Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
The	 STAI	 (Laux,	 Glanzmann,	 Schaffner,	 &	 Spielberger,	 1981;	
Spielberger,	Gorsuch,	&	Lushene,	1970)	was	used	 to	assess	 trait	
anxiety.	The	STAI	consists	of	20	items	referring	to	general	feelings	
of	 stress,	worry	and	discomfort.	Each	 item	 is	 rated	on	a	4‐point	
scale; a high total value indicates higher levels of trait anxiety. 
In	 the	 current	 sample,	 the	 internal	 consistency	 was	 moderate	
(α = 0.88).
2.3 | Sleep diary
Daily subjective sleep parameters were measured using a sleep diary 
(Carney et al., 2012). Every morning, upon awakening, participants 
completed	 a	 sleep	 diary	 via	 an	 online	 platform.	 Included	 in	 these	
entries were questions about the following aspects of the previous 
night´s sleep: (a) the duration of time to fall asleep in minutes (i.e., 
SOL),	 (b)	 the	number	of	hours	spent	sleeping	 (i.e.,	TST)	and	 (c)	 the	
overall	quality	of	sleep	(SQ).	These	questions	are	rated	on	a	5‐point	
scale	 (1	 =	 very	 poor;	 5	 =	 very	 good).	 All	 diary	 entries	made	 after	
17:00 hours were excluded from the analysis to avoid possible con‐
tamination	by	memory	bias.	On	average,	participants	completed	the	
diary for 6.75 (SD	=	0.64)	nights.
2.4 | Actigraphy
Objective	 sleep	 parameters	 were	 measured	 via	 actigraphy.	
Participants	wore	 an	 actigraph	 (wGT3X‐BT;	ActiGraph,	 Pensacola,	
FL,	USA)	 on	 their	 non‐dominant	wrist	 for	 seven	 consecutive	 days	
following the laboratory assessment (the questionnaires and the 
AST).	Physical	activity	was	recorded	with	a	sampling	rate	of	30	Hz	
and aggregated in 1‐min epochs. The sleep–wake cycle was defined 
by the Cole‐Kripke algorithm (Cole, Kripke, Gruen, Mullaney, & 
Gillin,	1992).	Although	actigraphs	 sometimes	misinterpret	physical	
movements during sleep as being awake and motorless awaking as 
sleeping, actigraphy has been shown to be consistent with polysom‐
nography	(>	80%	accuracy;	Ancoli‐israel	et	al.,	2003;	Cellini,	Buman,	
McDevitt, Ricker, & Mednick, 2013). Furthermore, actigraphy main‐
tains ecological validity, as participants do not have to sleep in un‐
familiar settings such as a sleep laboratory (cf. the first night effect; 
e.g.,	Byun,	Kim,	Moon,	Motamedi,	&	Cho,	2019).	In	the	current	study,	
valid actigraphy data were obtained for participants for an average 
of	6.24	(SD = 1.03) nights, after excluding nights with large inconsist‐
encies in in‐bed and out‐of‐bed times (> 0.5 hr) between sleep diary 
and actigraphy.
2.5 | Ambiguous scenario task
The stimuli were adapted from an earlier study (Ree et al., 2006) 
and included 27 ambiguous scenarios for each of the insomnia and 
anxiety versions. When translating the scenarios into German, we 
dropped three items from the insomnia version and five items from 
the anxiety version because they were not sufficiently ambiguous 
in the German translation (some of the German words do not have 
double meanings to make a scenario ambiguous: e.g., a father's “urn” 
on a mantelpiece). Two extra scenarios were created to replace the 
omitted	 items;	 therefore,	 the	 final	 set	 of	 scenarios	 consists	 of	 24	
items for each version.
Insomnia‐	 and	 anxiety‐related	 scenarios	 were	 presented	 in	 a	
quasi‐random order; that is, the insomnia‐related and anxiety‐related 
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scenarios	were	intermixed	in	a	single	block.	Interpretational	bias	was	
assessed both in an open‐ended and in a forced‐choice response 
form. For each scenario, participants were first instructed to write 
down their initial interpretation of the situation (i.e., open‐ended re‐
sponses). They were explicitly informed that the scenarios can be 
interpreted in several ways, and to simply describe how they would 
interpret	 each	 scenario	 in	 the	 provided	 text	 box.	 Subsequently,	
two possible interpretations of the same scenario were displayed: 
a neutral interpretation and a threat‐related interpretation that re‐
ferred either to insomnia or to anxiety. Participants were instructed 
to indicate which interpretation was more likely to be true (i.e., 
forced‐choice responses). The following is an example scenario with 
insomnia‐related and neutral response options:
Fogginess made it difficult for Julie to get going in the morning.
•	 Response	 option	 a:	 Her	 drowsiness	 made	 it	 difficult	 to	 get	
going.
• Response option b: The weather made it difficult to get going.
The open‐ended responses were coded as either threat consis‐
tent or threat inconsistent by two of the authors (FG and GW), in‐
dependently.	 A	 response	was	 coded	 as	 insomnia	 consistent	when	
it had sleep keywords referring to sleep problems, sleeping pills or 
concerns/worry	about	 sleep.	Several	participants	did	not	describe	
the situation but only paraphrased the presented sentence; these 
were coded as insomnia inconsistent even when a “sleep keyword” 
was	present.	Similarly,	open‐ended	responses	on	the	anxiety	version	
of	the	AST	were	coded	as	anxiety	consistent	versus	anxiety	inconsis‐
tent by the independent raters. Based on participants’ open‐ended 
responses, we found that one anxiety‐related scenario was not suf‐
ficiently ambiguous. Therefore, this scenario was excluded from the 
analyses.	On	average,	 inter‐rater	 reliability	 for	 the	open‐ended	re‐
sponses was good (κ	=	0.86	and	agreement	rate	=	94%	for	all	ratings	
across	both	versions	of	the	AST).
2.6 | Procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory individually, although 
up	to	two	participants	were	tested	simultaneously.	All	participants	
provided written informed consent after having received expla‐
nations	 about	 the	 study	protocol.	 In	 the	 laboratory,	 participants	
answered	 several	 questionnaires,	 including	 the	 PSQI,	 PSAS	 and	
STAI.	Afterwards,	 they	completed	 the	 following	computer	 tasks:	
the	AST,	the	dot‐probe	task	(Macmahon	et	al.,	2006)	and	the	pay‐
per‐view task (Takano & Raes, 2018). The latter two tasks are not 
reported here as these are out of the scope of the current study. 
The	 task	 order	was	 randomized	 across	 participants.	On	 the	 fol‐
lowing day, we began monitoring participants’ sleep using actigra‐
phy	and	sleep	diaries;	this	lasted	for	seven	consecutive	days.	After	
completing the sleep assessment, participants were once again in‐
vited to the laboratory to be given monetary compensation of 30€ 
or	40€.	The	amount	given	was	determined	based	on	the	partici‐
pant's performance in the pay‐per‐view task. The study protocol 
was approved by the ethical committee of the Department of 
Psychology,	LMU	Munich.
2.7 | Statistical analyses
To	ensure	the	unifactor	structure	of	both	AST	versions	(even	after	
translation and adaptation to the German language), we first per‐
formed	 exploratory	 factor	 analyses	 on	 the	 responses	 to	 the	 AST.	
Second,	we	conducted	a	series	of	correlation	and	regression	analy‐
ses to test the hypothesized associations between interpretational 
bias, pre‐sleep worry and both subjective and objective sleep esti‐
mates.	Specifically,	we	used	hierarchical	multiple	regressions	to	test	
(a) whether the associations can be uniquely attributed to pre‐sleep 
worry even after controlling for general trait anxiety and (b) whether 
the associations are unique to subjective (versus objective) esti‐
mates of the sleep parameters.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Descriptives
Table 1 describes the means and SDs	of	the	assessed	variables.	In	the	
current	 sample,	 34	 (45%)	 participants	 exhibited	 clinically	 significant	
sleep	disturbances	 (above	 the	cut‐off	of	5	 in	 the	PSQI	global	 score;	
Buysse	et	al.,	1989).	Although	it	is	already	known	that	students	tend	
to	have	more	sleep	problems	than	older	individuals	(e.g.,	Lund,	Reider,	
Whiting, & Prichard, 2010), it is noteworthy that the prevalence rate in 
the sample study is higher than in the general population.
3.2 | Factor analyses on the AST items
Given	that	we	made	several	modifications	to	the	items	of	the	AST	due	
to language differences, we performed exploratory factor analyses on 
the	responses	of	all	versions	of	the	AST	(insomnia	and	anxiety	related;	
forced choice and open ended). This allowed us to test the (uni)factor 
structure	of	the	AST	items	and	to	select	items	that	are	internally	con‐
sistent with each insomnia‐ and anxiety‐consistent interpretation. 
Because both forced‐choice and open‐ended responses were dummy 
coded, we first estimated polychoric correlations. These were then 
submitted to factor analyses, assuming a unifactor structure. The re‐
sults suggest that around half of the items were loaded on a single la‐
tent	 factor	 within	 each	 version	 of	 the	 AST	 (see	 Table	 A1	 and	 A2).	
Therefore, we selected the items that had good factor loadings (> 0.30) 
for both the forced‐choice and open‐ended response types. This item 
selection	resulted	in	11	items	for	the	insomnia	AST	and	six	items	for	
the	anxiety	AST,	which	were	then	used	to	score	insomnia‐	and	anxi‐
ety‐consistent interpretational bias in the following analyses.1
1 Because	of	this	large	reduction	in	items,	we	repeated	the	same	analyses	with	all	items	
that	were	included	in	the	ASTs.	We	found	that	the	results	were	overall	unchanged;	e.g.,	
pre‐sleep worry was significantly positively associated with insomnia‐consistent 
interpretational bias (r = 0.32 for forced‐choice and r = 0.26 for open‐ended responses), 
but not with anxiety‐consistent bias (r = 0.06 for forced‐choice and r = 0.06 for 
open‐ended responses). Trait anxiety showed significant correlations with all these 
measures of bias with rs = 0.26 – 0.31.
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3.3 | Correlations
Forced‐choice and open‐ended responses were moderately‐to‐highly 
correlated with each other for both the insomnia‐ and anxiety‐related 
AST	(Table	1).	These	two	types	of	responses	showed	similar	patterns	
of correlations with sleep and anxiety variables. Consistent with pre‐
vious findings, insomnia‐related interpretational bias was positively 
correlated	with	 the	PSQI	 score,	 indicating	 a	 link	between	 stronger	
interpretational bias and worse global sleep quality. Note that the 
correlation reached statistical significance only for the forced‐choice 
but not for the open‐ended responses, although we did not see a 
substantial difference in the magnitude between these two correla‐
tions. General pre‐sleep arousal also showed a positive correlation 
with insomnia‐related interpretational bias, although this correlation 
was statistically significant only for cognitive arousal (i.e., pre‐sleep 
worry)	but	not	for	somatic	arousal.	Neither	the	PSQI	nor	PSAS	scores	
were significantly associated with anxiety‐related interpretational 
bias.	The	STAI	was	the	only	measure	that	was	significantly	correlated	
with both insomnia‐ and anxiety‐related interpretational bias.
3.4 | Regressions
To clarify whether pre‐sleep worry has a unique effect on insomnia‐
related interpretational bias over and above trait anxiety, we per‐
formed	 two‐step	 hierarchical	multiple	 regression	 analyses.	 In	 the	
first	step,	we	entered	the	two	PSAS	scores	into	a	model	that	pre‐
dicted	either	 forced‐choice	or	open‐ended	 responses	 in	 the	AST.	
Subsequently,	 the	STAI	score	was	added	to	the	regression	model.	
The results revealed a significant effect of cognitive arousal in the 
first	step,	which	was,	however,	dissolved	when	adding	the	STAI	in	
the second step (Table 2). These findings suggest that the associa‐
tion between pre‐sleep worry and insomnia‐related interpreta‐
tional bias can be explained by trait anxiety. We also performed 
similar multiple regression analyses on anxiety‐consistent interpre‐
tational	bias,	which	revealed	a	significant	effect	of	the	STAI	but	not	
PSAS.	These	results	imply	that	individuals	with	higher	levels	of	pre‐
sleep worry are more prone to interpret an ambiguous situation in 
an insomnia‐related (but not anxiety‐related) manner; however, this 
tendency can be attributed to trait anxiety in general.2
To test the associations between interpretational bias and 
specific subjective and objective sleep parameters (based on the 
collected sleep diary and actigraphy data), another set of multiple 
regression analyses was performed. Each interpretational bias was 
predicted	by	SOL	and	TST	estimates	of	the	sleep	diary	and	actig‐
raphy data. The regression models also included the daily overall 
subjective sleep quality as a predictor. The results indicated that 
only daily, overall subjective sleep quality is associated with insom‐
nia‐related interpretational bias (for forced‐choice responses; see 
Table	3).	Neither	the	subjective	nor	the	objective	estimates	of	SOL	
2 As	Ree	et	al.	(2006)	found	a	significant	interaction	between	sleep	disturbances	and	trait	
anxiety in predicting interpretational bias, we also tested the moderation effect of the 
STAI	on	the	association	between	the	PSAS	and	interpretation	bias.	However,	the	results	
showed no significant interactions for forced‐choice or open‐ended responses (ps> 
0.42).T
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and	TST	were	associated	with	the	insomnia‐related	interpretational	
bias. Furthermore, we estimated similar regression models predict‐
ing anxiety‐related interpretational bias, which showed that none of 
the diary and actigraphy parameters was associated with this bias. 
These results suggest that insomnia‐consistent interpretational 
bias is only associated with the overall evaluation of poor‐quality 
sleep, and not with the estimates of individual sleep parameters.
3.5 | Interpretational bias and differences between 
subjective and objective sleep parameters
To explicitly test whether interpretational bias is associated with 
a misperception of sleep (i.e., over‐ or underestimation of sleep 
parameters), we also examined the correlations with the difference 
scores between the subjective and objective sleep parameters of the 
SOL	and	TST.	We	found	no	significant	correlations	for	the	SOL	dif‐
ferences: r = 0.17 and 0.10 with insomnia‐related interpretational 
bias (forced choice and open ended, respectively); r = 0.10 and 0.13 
with	anxiety‐related	interpretational	bias.	However,	the	TST	differ‐
ence score showed a small negative correlation with anxiety‐related 
interpretational bias for forced‐choice (r	=	−0.24,	p = .03), but not for 
open‐ended, responses (r	=	−0.16).	The	correlation	with	insomnia‐re‐
lated interpretational bias was not significant for the forced‐choice 
or open‐ended responses: r	=	−0.07	and	−0.04.	These	findings	sug‐
gest that interpretational bias is not related to biased estimations of 
individual sleep parameters.
 Estimates SE t p 95% CI Fit
IV:	AST	Insomnia	(Forced	choice)
Step 1      R2 = 0.095
PSAS	Som 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.94 [−0.18,	0.19]  
PSAS	Cog 0.11 0.04 2.46 0.02 [0.02,	0.21]  
Step 2      R2 = 0.189
PSAS	Som −0.09 0.09 0.92 0.36 [−0.27,	0.10]  
PSAS	Cog 0.07 0.05 1.53 0.13 [−0.02,	0.16]  
STAI‐T 0.10 0.03 2.89 0.01 [0.03,	0.17]  
IV:	AST	Insomnia	(Open	end)
Step 1      R2	=	0.084
PSAS	Som −0.04 0.09 0.45 0.66 [−0.23,	0.14]  
PSAS	Cog 0.12 0.05 2.49 0.02 [0.02,	0.21]  
Step 2      R2 = 0.163
PSAS	Som −0.13 0.09 1.33 0.19 [−0.32,	0.06]  
PSAS	Cog 0.08 0.05 1.63 0.11 [−0.02,	0.17]  
STAI‐T 0.09 0.04 2.59 0.01 [0.02,	0.16]  
Abbreviations:	AST,	ambiguous	scenario	task;	PSAS	Som	(Cog),	Pre‐sleep	Arousal	Scale	‐	Somatic	
arousal (Cognitive arousal).
TA B L E  2   Regressions predicting 
insomnia‐consistent interpretational bias 
by pre‐sleep arousal and trait anxiety 
(n = 76)
 Estimates SE t p 95% CI Fit
IV:	AST	Insomnia	(Forced	choice) R2	=	0.154
Acti	SOL 0.18 0.12 1.59 0.12 [−0.05,	0.41]  
Acti	TST 0.00 0.46 0.01 0.99 [−0.90,	0.91]  
Diary	SOL 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.53 [−0.03,	0.05]  
Diary	TST −0.09 0.57 0.16 0.87 [−1.24,	1.05]  
Diary quality −1.47 0.55 2.67 0.01 [−2.58,	−0.37]  
IV:	AST	Insomnia	(Open	end) R2 = 0.127
Acti	SOL 0.22 0.12 1.86 0.07 [−0.02,	0.45]  
Acti	TST 0.02 0.46 0.05 0.96 [−0.90,	0.95]  
Diary	SOL 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.96 [−0.04,	0.04]  
Diary	TST −0.51 0.58 0.88 0.38 [−1.67,	0.65]  
Diary quality −1.01 0.56 1.81 0.07 [−2.13,	0.10]  
Abbreviations:	AST,	ambiguous	scenario	task;	Acti,	actigraphy;	Diary,	sleep	diary;	SOL,	sleep	onset	
latency;	TST,	total	sleep	time.
TA B L E  3   Regressions predicting 
insomnia‐consistent interpretational bias 
by sleep diary and actigraphy estimates 
(n = 76)
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4  | DISCUSSION
Cognitive models of insomnia predict that biased cognition is the 
basis of pre‐sleep worry about sleeplessness, which arouses auto‐
nomic nervous activity and emotional distress, and thus prevents 
the normal initiation of sleep. We specifically tested whether insom‐
nia‐consistent interpretational bias is associated with (a) pre‐sleep 
worry and (b) perceived or real deficits of sleep. First, as predicted, 
the results showed that insomnia‐consistent interpretational bias is 
positively	 associated	with	 pre‐sleep	worry.	 Second,	we	 replicated	
previous findings regarding the association between insomnia‐con‐
sistent interpretational bias and global subjective sleep disturbances 
measured	 by	 the	 PSQI	 (Ellis,	 Gardani,	 &	 Hogh,	 2010;	 Ree	 et	 al.,	
2006). Third, this bias is not related to either subjective or objective 
estimates	of	SOL	and	TST;	rather,	this	bias	is	significantly	associated	
with participants’ overall evaluations of daily sleep quality.
The	 replicated	 association	 between	 the	 AST	 and	 PSQI	 high‐
lights the robustness of interpretational bias among individuals 
with	subjective	sleep	disturbances.	Pre‐sleep	worry	(PSAS	cognitive	
arousal) was also found to be associated with this interpretational 
bias. Furthermore, this association seems to be domain specific, as 
pre‐sleep worry was not significantly correlated with anxiety‐re‐
lated interpretational bias. These findings fit the model's prediction 
that the biased cognition “fuels” pre‐sleep worry, increasing arousal 
and anxiety, and thus contributing to sleep disturbances (Ree et al., 
2006).	However,	worry	had	no	effect	on	interpretational	bias	after	
controlling for trait anxiety. Thus, although the association may be 
attributed to general anxiety, it is not specific to sleep‐related (or 
insomnia‐related) worry. Given the moderate correlation between 
the	PSAS	and	STAI,	there	is	a	significant	amount	of	overlap	in	indi‐
viduals	with	pre‐sleep	worry	and	those	with	trait	anxiety.	It	appears	
that anxious individuals tend to interpret ambiguous situations in a 
threat‐related manner: this phenomenon is not limited to insomnia, 
but also applies to anxiety and threats in general. Thus, if individuals 
exhibit general trait anxiety, they are likely to also exhibit insomnia‐
related interpretational bias.
Contrary to our hypothesis, interpretational bias was not related 
to the (mis)perception of sleep. More specifically, neither a per‐
ceived nor real (objective) state of sleep correlates with the extent 
of	 interpretational	 bias.	 Instead,	 interpretational	 bias	 is	 associated	
with overall daily sleep quality (over a 1‐week period). These results 
suggest that the bias may be related to the cognitive processes in‐
volved in integrating pieces of information about perceived sleep 
(e.g.,	SOL	and	TST)	to	 judge	the	overall	quality	of	one's	sleep.	 It	 is	
possible that people with sleep disturbances have dysfunctional 
beliefs	about	sleep	(e.g.,	 I	have	to	have	8	hr	sleep	to	function	well	
during	 the	day;	Morin,	Vallières,	&	 Ivers,	2007),	which	make	 them	
feel that their sleep is insufficient even when they have an objec‐
tively sufficient amount of sleep (e.g., 7 hr) and correctly estimate 
the hours spent sleeping. This speculation should be tested in future 
research to better understand how individuals judge overall quality 
of sleep while holding such irrational beliefs, as well as how interpre‐
tational bias is related to this judgement process and creates a sense 
of sleeplessness. The non‐significant correlations between interpre‐
tational bias and (mis)perception of sleep might be due to the non‐
clinical nature of our sample; indeed, neither the sleep onset latency 
nor total sleep time (subjective and objective) indicated severe sleep 
problems	in	our	participants	(e.g.,	mean	TST	=	7.47	and	7.26	hr	for	
diary and actigraphy estimates, respectively). We therefore agree 
that a replication of the current findings in a more heterogeneous 
sample with diverse patterns of sleep (covering clinically significant 
levels of disturbances) is desirable.
Several	 limitations	need	to	be	further	considered	when	inter‐
preting the present results. First, the non‐clinical nature of our 
sample may limit the clinical implications of these findings. We 
explicitly targeted a non‐clinical (or subclinical) sample, given that 
sleep misperception is a transient phenomenon between acute 
and chronic insomnia symptomatology. Nevertheless, a number 
of studies have suggested that clinical samples with a diagnosis 
of insomnia may exhibit more prominent cognitive dysfunctions 
(Vanable,	 Aikens,	 Tadimeti,	 Caruana‐Montaldo,	 &	 Mendelson,	
2000) and biases toward insomnia‐related stimuli (Taylor, Espie, 
&	White,	2003).	As	we	did	not	find	any	associations	between	the	
misperception of sleep and participants’ interpretational bias, 
future	 research	 should	 focus	 on	 clinical	 samples.	 Second,	 re‐
sponses	to	the	AST	are	known	to	be	primed	by	the	administration	
of sleep/insomnia questionnaires (Ellis et al., 2010). Because we 
administered	 all	 sleep	questionnaires	 prior	 to	 the	AST,	 it	 should	
be noted that this may have led to our participants being more 
prone to interpret the scenarios in an insomnia‐consistent manner. 
Furthermore,	it	is	likely	that	participants	realized	that	the	AST	was	
about insomnia (or anxiety). Knowing the intention of the task may 
have affected participants’ responses, for example, due to social 
desirability or a self‐serving bias. To overcome this issue, a more 
implicit task (e.g., based on response time) could be used in fu‐
ture research. Fourth, the relatively short period of sleep diary 
and actigraphy assessment may limit the generalizability of our 
results. Because we only found null or small correlations between 
the	 PSQI	 and	 diary/actigraphy	 estimations,	 we	 cannot	 exclude	
the possibility that the sleep‐assessment week was not typical for 
some participants. Replication is needed with a longer period for 
the diary and actigraphy assessments. Fifth, we experienced some 
difficulty	 in	creating	appropriate	 stimuli	 for	 the	AST	 in	our	 local	
language.	Several	items	were	eliminated	based	on	the	factor	anal‐
yses	 to	guarantee	 the	 internal	 consistency	of	 the	AST.	Although	
we believe that there is no substantial difference between the 
German	version	and	the	original	English	version	of	 the	AST,	par‐
ticularly in regard to the correlations with insomnia and anxiety 
measures, caution should be used when comparing the results of 
the two versions.
In	 conclusion,	 this	 study	 provides	 empirical	 evidence	 that	
interpretational bias is associated with pre‐sleep worry and an 
overall evaluation of poor sleep quality. Given the cross‐sectional 
nature of the findings, a prospective study is warranted to es‐
tablish the causal directions between the hypothesized cognitive 
processes	involved	in	the	cognitive‐hyperarousal	mechanism.	One	
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interesting direction would be to manipulate interpretational bias 
via	 a	 bias‐modification	 procedure	 (e.g.,	 Menne‐Lothmann	 et	 al.,	
2014),	as	this	may	provide	 information	about	the	cognitive	path‐
ways to sleep disturbances as well as have direct implications for 
clinical intervention.
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APPENDIX 
TA B L E  A 1   Factor loadings of items in the ambiguous scenario 
task for insomnia‐consistent interpretation
Item # Forced choice Open ended
19 0.80 0.36
22 0.72 0.63
10 0.64 0.59
9 0.61 0.25
24 0.56 0.69
20 0.50 0.61
7 0.50 0.35
12 0.45 0.55
11 0.41 0.78
5 0.38 0.12
23 0.35 0.33
18 0.35 0.38
16 0.34 0.22
4 0.34 0.47
21 0.33 0.21
13 0.30 –
1 0.25 −0.02
15 0.18 0.64
2 0.12 0.41
8 0.01 0.02
17 −0.01 −0.19
6 −0.07 0.33
3 −0.25 −0.20
14 −0.26 −0.11
Note: Bold items were used to score insomnia‐consistent interpreta‐
tional	bias.	Item	13	was	constant	as	all	participants	had	the	same	score	
on the open‐ended responses. The scenarios and response options 
can	be	found	in	the	OSF	page:	https	://osf.io/jbup4/	?view_only=252da	
13ed8	f94a9	c92c3	16bb8	3c1ee68
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TA B L E  A 2   Factor loadings of items in the ambiguous scenario 
task for anxiety‐consistent interpretation
Item # Forced choice Open ended
13 1.00 0.37
11 0.79 0.17
8 0.58 −0.11
2 0.57 0.66
1 0.56 0.38
6 0.50 0.12
15 0.49 0.34
10 0.47 0.40
21 0.46 0.62
20 0.44 −0.05
22 0.29 0.30
3 0.09 0.67
4 0.01 0.75
7 0.00 0.04
18 −0.06 0.70
17 −0.17 0.65
19 −0.29 −0.17
16 −0.36 0.37
23 −0.38 0.67
24 −0.39 0.11
14 −0.45 0.42
5 – 0.76
12 – −0.41
Note: Bold items were used to score anxiety‐consistent interpretational 
bias.	Items	5	and	12	were	constant	as	all	participants	made	the	same	
responses;	Item	9	was	excluded	from	the	analyses	because	of	the	
translational issue.
